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I. INTRODUCTION

Professor Alschuler has written a wide-ranging critique of The Path
of the Law,' using the piece as a touchstone for the form of legal
positivism associated with Justice Holmes.2 The critique cuts a broad

* Professor of Law, Affiliate Professor of Anthropology, University of Florida, Former
President Policy Science Center, Former Chair of the Board, Amnesty International (USA).
Professor Nagan wishes to acknowledge and to thank Vivile Rodin for research assistance and
suggestions. The basic ideas in this essay were presented at a faculty seminar at the University
of Cape Town, School of Law, South Africa, in July 1997. The seminar was titled Revisiting
the Path of the Law.
1. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897).
2. Alschuler sets up Path of the Law as a mature expression of Holmesian positivism.
Among the central elements of Holmesian positivism is Holmes' distinctive effort to separate
law from morality. Albert W. Alschuler, The Descending Trail: Holmes's Path of the Law One
Hundred Years Later, 49 FLA. L. REV. 353, 355 (1997) [hereinafter Alschuler, Descending
Trail]. His own perspective seems to be informed by a version of natural law, infused with
contemporary notions of "moral realism" See Albert W. Alschuler, Rediscovering Blackstone,
145 PENN. L. REv. 1, 54 (1996) [hereinafter Alschuler, Rediscovering Blackstone];see also infra
text accompanying notes 21-22. A specific indicator of this orientation is his seminal
reconstruction of Blackstone. See Alschuler, Rediscovering Blackstone, supra, at 24-27, 54
n.281.
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path through some of the classical problems of modem jurisprudence,
including the interrelations between the definition and theory of law. At
the heart of the critique is a deeply post-modernist idea, as well as a
classical, natural law-inspired precept, that the separation of law from
morality, quite simply, is wrong. Alschuler's descending trail is long and
treacherous. Given its breadth, the trail may be subject to justifiable
criticism that there are omissions along the way.
My less than wholehearted embrace of Alschuler's lecture lies not in
the detailed deconstruction that he gives of Path. Such an exercise may
miss important insights that are the product of contradiction, ambiguity,
or the incomplete evolution of Holmes' thinking presented in Path. I see
Path as a stream of consciousness piece rather than the epitome of
American legal positivism. As a stream of consciousness piece, it shifts
gears abruptly, mercurially assuming different, sometimes irreconcilable
vantage points. I do not find these flaws fatal. To the contrary, I find in
them a rich mine, filled with high-grade ore, the value of which permits
the construction of the most-fashionable, traditional, and radically
innovative juridical architecture.
My critique of Alschuler, then, is less the detail of his analysis than
his failure to acknowledge the ways readers may see different things in
Path. My view provides an indeterminate path and therefore provides a
more interesting vista for American legal thought than the path he
chooses to describe as descending. The outlines I provide may indicate
several trails, some of which are ascendant.

11. THE

BAD MAN AND SocIAL PROCESS

The Path of the Law has been lavishly praised in American academic
circles. For example, Judge Posner considers it the best law article ever
written.3 Although I have not read as prodigiously as Judge Posner, I

My sense of moral realism is that it comes up short on the priority that should be given to
moral and value assessments in community process and concrete choice (decisionmaking). The
questions ultimately are what moral values one recommends for the legal process, whether these
values can be objectively justified, and whether one should postulate and take responsibility for
the value and moral preferences one recommends for the community. See generally RONALD
DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 167-77 (1985).
3. Alschuler, Descending Trail, supra note 2, at 354 & n.5 (quoting Richard A. Posner,
Introductionto THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES: SELECrIONS FROM THE LE rERS, SPEECHES, JUDICIAL
OPINIONS AND OTHER WRITINGS OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR. at x (Richard A. Posner ed.,
1990)) (observing that Posner has referred to The Path of the Law as "[t]he best article-length
work on law ever written."); see also Richard A. Posner, The Path Away from the Law, I10
HARV. L. REV. 1039, 1042 (1997) ("The Path of the Law retains a remarkable freshness,
brimming with insights that illuminate today's legal system as much or more than that of the

nineteenth century.").
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am hesitant to underwrite such an unqualified appraisal. Perhaps the
learned judge was seduced by Holmes' references to the "man of
statistics,"4 and the "master of economics" as the beacon of law's
"future."
The Path of the Law has penetrating insights and riveting, as well as
disturbing, imagery. Path's confident diminishing of venerable common
law traditions5 and its shot at the unreality of Roman Law' still hold
the attention of the reader. Moreover, Holmes' dig at Ivy League and
Oxbridge scholasticism 7 has not undermined the intrinsic interest the
piece provokes among elite scholars and thoughtful practitioners.
Perhaps the most arresting and novel image that one gains from Path
is that of the "bad man."' The brooding omnipresence of this creature
of symbolic caricature has done its bit to undermine any simplistic
moral basis for law. Even more importantly, the bad man is in many
ways a modem person. Modem persons live and work in law and
4. Holmes, supra note 1, at 469. Holmes wrote:
For the rational study of the law, the black-letter man may be the man of the
present, but the man of the future is the man of statistics and the master of
economics. It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it
was laid down in the time of Henry IV.
Id. (emphasis added). The term "beacon" is a play on LIvA BAKER, THE JusTIcE FROM BEAcoN
HILL: THE LIFE & TIMES OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMEs (1991).
It may be of interest to American readers that Path was required reading for law students
at Oxford, where the study of jurisprudence is a serious thing and normally a mandated part of
the "honors" curriculum. My own introduction to Holmes and American legal thought occurred
as a law student at Oxford. In many ways, the piece was the antithesis of the dominant
analytical work of the Oxford school of the 1960s.
5. See Holmes, supra note 1, at 469 ("It is still more revolting if the grounds upon which
[a common law rule] was laid down have vanished long since, and the rule simply persists from
blind imitation of the past.").
6. See id. at 475 ('The advice of the elders to young men is very apt to be as unreal as
a list of the hundred best books. At least in my day I had my share of such counsels, and high
among the unrealities I place the recommendation to study the Roman Law.").
7. See id. at 468. Holmes wrote:
I cannot but believe that if the training of lawyers led them habitually to consider
more definitely and explicitly the social advantage on which the rule they lay down
must be justified, they sometimes would hesitate where now they are confident, and
see that really they were taking sides upon debatable and often burning questions.
Id.
8. The "bad man" enters the stage at the point where Holmes stresses the need for a
"business-like" understanding of the "limits" of law. The bad man cares nothing for the ethical
rule and only wants to know the limits of the law so he can avoid an encounter with public
force. See id at 459.
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elsewhere under the omnipresence of a fractured moral prism. Separating law from morality may be an important analytical exercise in
training legal neophytes. But its consequences are not neat pigeon holes
of conceptual and normative difference. A modem person cannot neatly
say, "Here's the law; here's morality."
Nevertheless, the bad man as a modem man-the achieving,
competitive, ego-defined actor-is supposed to be free of moral
sentiment and from the view of analytical juridical imperatives, free
from moral contamination and communitarian sentimentality. The lens
that yields this insight is not an analytical slight of hand such as a
criterion of formal validation. It is the perspective of a legal system
whose animating concern is self-interest and whose strategic positioning
is that of a claimant: one making demands for social, economic, or
political value. The bad man thrives on his liberty, or to his adversary,
his license.
Someone studying the bad man through the lens of observation may
see different phenomena from the same construct. The observer's lens
may disclose, for example, that the bad man's life is permeated by the
complexities of identity, demand, and choice. It may show that his
demands, patterns of identity, and choice-making activity encompass
ethical and value choices. There is no escape from the consequences of
one's own goodness or badness in law or in life. Consequences in turn
influence the being and becoming of identity, demand, and expectation.
This implication may
be the harbinger of what Grant Gilmore called our
"age of anxiety,"9 and what Dean Kronman more powerfully assayed
in his book, The Lost Lawyer."
Path is in some ways, as I shall try.to show, a paradoxical article. It
seeks both to purge and to integrate law into the experience of society.
If we accept the proposition that experience includes moral experience,
the purge component is obvious. Holmes wants to purge law of moral
sentiment, to wash law in "cynical acid."" As Alschuler suggests,"

9. See generally GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 68-98 (1977).
10. See generally ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER 126-28 (1993).
11. Holmes, supra note 1, at 461-62 ("You see how the vague circumference of the notion
of duty shrinks and at the same time grows more precise when we wash it with cynical acid and
expel everything except our study, the operations of the law."); see also id. at 459 ("'The first
thing for a business-like understanding of the matter is to understand its limits, and therefore I
think it desirable at once to point out and dispel a confusion between morality and law .... ).
If you look at law from the point of view of the bad man who "wants to avoid an encounter
with public force," it will be obvious that the bad man "cares nothing for an ethical rule," but
will "care a good deal to avoid being made to pay money, and will keep out of jail if he can."

Id. at 459.
12. See Alschuler, Descending Trail, supra note 2, at 380-86.
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the target seems to be the old natural law bugaboo. But I suspect we can
affirm with confidence that moral experience is not solely rooted in
trans-empirical, traditional natural law ideas. Moral experience is an
intrinsic part of social process and social interaction. Thus, Path seeks
to integrate experience into legal discourse and at the same time purge
it of moral experience.
The stuff of human interaction in social process cannot, as a
descriptive matter, be purged of the moral and value component of
experience. Regardless of specified moral or normative preferences, the
world of social organization is infected with the normative component
of demands for values and responses to them. Law is one of the major
arbiters of social choice. Holmes' own plea for experience over
formalism, social reality and considerations of social advantage over
historicism and the logical syllogism, 3 indirectly produces a moral and
value sensitivity to legal process and legal understanding through the
prism of human experience. But this kind of moral experience might
provoke an even bigger crisis of identity for law and the legal profession
than even Holmes imagined. How would Holmes view Critical Race
Theory, Feminist Legal Theory, Critical Legal Studies, or the Jurisprudence of Human Rights, the pathways of which are rooted in deeper
ideas about the reality of social process as well as human and moral
experience? Could Holmes have imagined a court like the European
Court of Human Rights, or is there a hidden parochial vista in Holmes
causing even this glimpse into the infinite to be astigmatic and finite?
Holmes was a very American brahman.
III. THE PATH OF THE LAW AS IMMATURE JURISPRUDENCE
Holmes' life was shaped by at least three major themes: the intellectualism of his home life, his near death during the Civil War, and his
experience with law and the legal profession. 4 Consequently, we may
appraise The Path of the Law as an outstanding example of the tensions
generated by the co-existence of a strong sense of professionalism, a
wide-ranging intellectual curiosity, and a survivor's view of human
circumstance. The last trait may have produced Holmes' pragmatism and
his valuation of experience over form.
From this perspective, Professor Alschuler's article is something of
a disappointment. It fails to capture the biographical roots from which
we may garner a sense of Holmes' deep professionalism and intellectual
13. According to Holmes: 'The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience."
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 5 (Oxford Univ. Press 1963).
14. See generally BAKER, supra note 4, at 21-43, 105-246 (providing a detailed

biographical description of Holmes's family life, military career, and life as a scholar).
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curiosity. As a result, the interesting tensions these themes generate are
undervalued, leaving us with a misleading sense of Path's impact on
modem American legal thought. The true target of Alschuler's critique
is positivism. Holmes' Path just happens to be the specific target of
Alschuler's article.
Alschuler says that Path provides a "mature, polished expression of
[Holmes'] understanding of law."' 5 I do not find this piece either
mature or polished. Moreover, since Path suggests that legal theory may
partake of many curious strands, I am unable to comfortably accept the
designation of Holmesian positivism as a mature and polished jurisprudence.
I agree that the notions of "prediction," the "bad man," "moral
terminology," and Holmes' ideas about both contract and interpretation
are highly visible elements of Path.6 I also agree that Path can be
reduced to these core concerns that are expressed as the rudiments of
Holmesian positivism. 7 This is conventional wisdom. Indeed, these are
points that would have been made in the good undergraduate essays of
several generations of Oxbridge undergraduates. Certainly, the point of
the predictor and prediction having the same identity 8 is a longstanding criticism of Holmes. Scholars also have often noted Holmes'
realist observation that results count more than juridical elegance or
logical symmetry. 9 It is decidedly unhelpful to tell the predictor that
the predictor's prediction is law. The underdeveloped point of great
interest is Alschuler's suggestion that Holmes' prediction theory does
not help the bad man who, at least in Holmes' terms, needs prediction
to avoid bad consequences."
As noted earlier, Alschuler correctly and conventionally breaks Path
down into four distinctive components that add up to Holmes' distinctive vision of law.2 Although Alschuler has himself a brooding moral
15. Alschuler, Descending Trail, supra note 2, at 355.
16. Id. at 355-56 (quoting Holmes, supra note 1, at 459, 461-62, 464).
17. See id. at 355.
18. See id. at 364-65.
19. See, e.g., Winston P. Nagan, Conflicts Theory in Conflict, 3 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 343, 435-36 (1982) (quoting Holmes, supra note 13, at 5) ("Results were seen to
encapsulate the heart of the judicial process, not merely juridical elegance or symmetry. 'The
life of the law has not been logic' said Holmes in his Common Law, 'it has been experience.' ").
20. See Alschuler, Descending Trail, supra note 2, at 371-73 (suggesting that the "bad
man" concerns himself with the sheriff's behavior rather than the court's behavior). Holmes
suggests the idea of law as systematized prediction: "The number of our predictions when
generalized and reduced to a system is not unmanageably large." Holmes, supra note 1, at 458.
We may note that Holmes did not accurately "predict" the effects of the globalization of law or
computer technology's impact on law in the latter part of the 20th century.
21. See Alschuler, Descending Trail, supra note 2, at 355-56.
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realism, the breakdown is cast in a style more characteristic of analytical
jurisprudence. This is important because there are many different
varieties of positivism. Holmes's version of it is anti-formalist, and in
many respects, an attack on the formalism of Langdell-style law, which
extolled the virtues of doctrine, analysis, and appellate opinions.'
Thus, Professor Alschuler's appraisal of Path focuses on something
called "Holmesian positivism."" The elements or major tenets of
Holmesian positivism are correctly identified as involving four dominant
themes or emphases.24 To give concrete expression to Holmes' special
brand of positivism, Alschuler underlines the themes of law as prophecy,
the invention of the "bad man," the blunt effort to exorcise moral
language from law, and his unpacking of the duty to keep a contract for
the purpose of analysis and appraisalY
Alschuler's critique that it is singularly unhelpful to tell the judge
that the law he or she is to prescribe is a prediction of what the judge
will do26 generates an interesting rebuttal. Posner, for example,
suggests that one can provide a stronger basis for the prediction theory
by arguing that there are more lower court judges than higher court
judges and that lower court judges must predict higher court judges'
behaviors.' This argument is, in my view, a weak justification for
Holmes' predictive theory because the theory confuses vantage point,
decisionmaking, and the distinctive view of the problemsolver, as well
as the observer's intellectual tools.
I believe that Holmes' prophecy theory and his bad man metaphor
stumble into the central problem of post-modem jurisprudence: the

22. See generally KRONMAN, supra note 10, at 169-74. Path was not delivered at Harvard,
but at Boston University. The Path of the Law After One Hundred Years: Introduction, 110
HARV. L. REv. 989, 989 (1997). Its subtext also may have been an attack on Harvard-style legal
education, which was influenced by Christopher Columbus Langdell's version of legal science.
See KRONMAN, supra note 10, at 169-74. Langdell's great contribution to legal education is what
today could be called programmed learning. See id. at 170-74. Langdell's invention of the
casebook and the case-method are highly successful efforts to create a pedagogy based on legal
science. Id. at 170. The widespread criticism of Langdell-style formalism or legal geometry is
the failure of the approach to account for choice and decision in the adjudicatory process. Id.
at 209. Holmes was convinced that the key to law lies in the proposition that judges make law.
Holmes observed: 'he prophesies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more
pretentious are what I mean by the law." Holmes, supra note 1, at 461. In this sense, the bad
man device is also meant to bring attention to the role of the judge in understanding and shaping
law. But doctrine and formalism are equated with Langdell's legacy.
23. Alschuler, Descending Trail, supra note 2, at 355.
24. See id. at 355-56.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 364-65.
27. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 224 (1990).
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problem of vantage point. In fact, Pathmakes a critical, but unconscious
contribution to the issue of vantage point. The legal realist gloss on
Holmes was, of course, an insistance on the scientific importance of the
vantage point of an observer." This suggested an important distinction

28. On the jurisprudence of vantage point, consider Reisman's comment:
For any phenomenon, there are many possible standpoints, each of which affects
it and how it is viewed. Clarity with regard to observational standpoint is an
indispensable intellectual tool. Both the reference and content of the term "law"
will vary depending on whether the standpoint is that of a member of elite or the
rank-and-file .... Perception of the same phenomenon may vary depending on the
culture, class, gender, age, or crisis-experience of the observer. Even within the
legal establishment, reference and content will vary depending on whether the
observer is a legislator, a judge, a prosecutor, a juror, a defense attorney, an
accused or a victim. No standpoint is more authentic than another, but the scholar
must be sensitive to variations in perception that attend each perspective and must
try to disengage himself or herself, select one that is appropriate to the task and
carefully determine and consistently maintain it.
In all observation, the individual self-system is the ultimate instrument of
perception, appraisal and choice. Because it is necessary to calibrate all instruments, a second preliminary intellectual task ... is one "self-calibration" by
various techniques of self-scrutiny: the person performing a decision function is
urged to examine the self for latent emotional problems or neurotic tendencies, subgroup parochialism and the distortions that may arise from professional conditioning.
W. Michael Reisman, The View from the New Haven School of InternationalLaw, in PUBLIC
ORDER OF THE WORLD COMMUNrrY (teaching materials) 1, 2-3 (W. Michael Reisman ed., 1997)
(emphasis added). In an earlier formulation of the problem of vantage point, Professor Lasswell
suggested that establishing an appropriate observational standpoint was also an important, even
inspirational, act of creative orientation:
Now it is impossible to abolish uncertainty by the refinement of retrospective
observations, by the accumulation of historical detail, by the application of
precision methods to elapsed events; the crucial test of adequate analysis is nothing
less than the future verification of the insight into the nature of the master
configuration against which details are constructed. Each specific interpretation is
subject to redefinition as the structural potentialities of the future become
actualized in the past and present of participant observers. The analyst moves
between the contemplation of detail and of configuration, knowing that the
soundness of result is an act of creative orientation rather than of automatic
projection. The search for precision in the routines of the past must be constantly
chastened and given relevance and direction by reference to the task of selforientation which is the goal of analysis.
HAROLD D. LASSWELL, WORLD POLITICS AND PERSONAL INSECURITY 13 (1965)). For a further
discussion of the observational standpoint, see I HAROLD D. LASSWELL & MYRES S.
MCDOUGAL, JURISPRUDENCE FOR A FREE SOCIETY 22-24 (1992).
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between a theory "of' law-which takes the vantage point of players
internal to the system such as judges and "bad" men-and theories
"about" law." It would have been useful and insightful if Alschuler
had more carefully appraised the "prediction" theory in light of the
important discussion about this matter in the literature of legal theory.
It also would have been useful to have, say, Posner acknowledge that
law and economics is a theory about law, as are such modem developments like feminist theory, critical theory, and critical-race theory.
A more telling critique of how Alschuler and Posner debate the
prediction theory lies in the deeper implications of the proposition that
judges make law and that prediction is a critical perspective for the legal
operator as claimant or decisionmaker. The prediction theory anticipates,
in my view, the modem discourse about lawyer roles and judicial roles.
I believe it would be fair to hold that Holmes and Path did a great deal
to bring attention to the role of the judge and other actors in the legal
order. Here, Holmes generated an important conversation-one of the
most important later expressions of which was Cardozo's book, The
Nature of the Judicial Process." If we accept a broadening of
Holmes's prediction idea in the manner suggested by Cardozo,3" we
begin to come to terms with the real implications of Holmes' prediction
postulate. The modem jurisprudence of lawyer roles, of judging roles,
and of scholarly roles in the mansion of law suggest a very different
kind of positivism from the formalism that Holmes and other pragmatists sought to undermine.
Path, therefore, is a piece that is curious and littered with both
inviting insights and potent imagery. Path, viewed as a whole, is really

29. For discussion of theories "about" law versus theories "of' law, see LASSWELL &
MCDOUGAL, supra note 28, at 3-48; Joseph W. Bingham, What Is Law?, 11 MICH. L. REV. 1,
1-25 (1912); W.W. Cook, Scientific Method and the Law, 13 ABA J. 303, 303-09 (1927);
Nagan, supra note 19, at 396-401. The precept or rules-oriented jurisprudence of Professor Hart
has insisted that the notion of prediction is not reducible to the internal perspective of law and
cannot account for the notion of legal obligation inherent in a rules-based conception of law. See
H.L.A. Hart, Definition and Theory in Jurisprudence,70 L.Q. REV. 37, 38 (1954). For a critique
of Hart's position, see Nagan, supra note 19, at 400-01.
30. BENJAMIN CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921).

31. See generally id. Justice Cardozo grapples with the insight garnered from Holmes that
judges make law. However, Cardozo has sought to shift the focus from simply prophecy and
prediction to, in effect, the second part of Holmes' essay, namely, the forces that condition
judge-made law. The Justice carefully considers the nature of judicial decisionmaking in terms
of the methods of philosophy, the methods of history, tradition and sociology, the methods of
sociology and legislation, and the force of precedent and the subconscious element in the judicial
process. See generally id. Cardozo's study of the judicial process provides an important bridge
to post-realists' concepts of the legal process and post-realists' concepts of choice and
decisionmaking.
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a piece of two radically different perspectives. These perspectives focus
on the limits of the law, which is Holmes' angle into cleansing law from
moral sentiment with "cynical acid,"32 and the idea of looking at law
from a perspective that is external and at times even regal.
IV. A PATH TO A MORE MATURE JURISPRUDENCE:
THE NATURE OF DECISIONMAKING

It will be obvious from what I have indicated that I do not find
Alschuler's conventional reading the most interesting slant on The Path
of the Law. One may view Path as, among other things, an attempt to
come to terms more realistically with the role of the operator in law. A
key operator of the legal system is the judge. Consequently, Path is an
interesting way of getting at the limiting aspect of the judge's role.33
It is limiting in the sense that it purges judge-made law from moral
sentiment. The bad man is the key to understanding the limiting role of
law in this sense. What I find of consummate interest is Holmes' gloss
on the nature of judicial decisionmaking.
The Path of the Law should be understood in the context of Holmes'
other insights into the science of judge-made law. The notion of
prediction has been transformed into a kind of result-selective, unprincipled conception associated with cruder versions of legal realism.34 But
a more general appreciation of what Path suggests focuses on the
indices judges use to decide cases and the indices decisionmakers use
to resolve problems. Here, the impact on American legal thought is a
much richer contribution to a variety of positivism that stresses
empirical indicia of judicial decisionmaking, as well as lawyer roles,
rather than a singular emphasis on logical syntactical derivation.
Path may be read as an effort to come to terms with the nature of
judicial decisionmaking. It would be useful to compare Holmes' effort
with the more ambitious reflections of Justice Cardozo in Nature of the

32. See Holmes, supra note 1, at 462.
33. It is unclear from Path whether Holmes was focusing narrowly on practitioner or
judging roles, or more generally on all legally relevant roles. Indeed, I am uncertain about the
original purpose of Path.The ambiguity and contradictions are what give Pathits enduring value
to legal scholars and those interested in the contributions that lawyers make to social and
political thought. See Thomas C. Grey, Holmes and Legal Pragmatism,41 STAN. L. REV. 787,
828 (1989) (Grey purports to have a clear picture of Path's path). Alschuler also discusses the
question of the roles that Holmes meant to address. Alschuler, Descending Trail, supra note 2,
at 369-73. In fact, I agree with Alschuler that the bad man is usefully seen as a consumer of
law. Id. at 371 ("Holmes' bad man was not a lawyer, he was a consumer of law."). Of course,
the paradigm of positivist advocacy often can lead to the bad man's ego being overtaken by his
lawyer's ego.
34. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 3-4 (1978).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol49/iss3/4

10

Nagan: Not Just a Descending Trail: Traversing Holmes' Many Paths of the
DUNWODY COMMENTARY

Judicial Process. According to Cardozo, the key question for judgemade law is:
What is it that I do when I decide a case? To what sources
of information do I appeal for guidance? In what proportions
do I permit them to contribute to the result? In what proportions ought they to contribute?... If no precedent is applicable, how
do I reach the rule that will make a precedent for the
35
future?
Justice Cardozo tried to isolate and clarify what he called the "forces"
to be obeyed and the methods to be applied in the appraisal and
prescription of past practice. He described these methods or techniques
as follows:
The directive force of a principle may be exerted along the
line of logical progression; this I will call the rule of
analogy or the method of philosophy; along the line of
historical development; this I will call the method of
evolution; along the line of customs of the community; this
I will call the method of tradition; along the lines of justice,
morals and social welfare, the36 mores of the day; this I will
call the method of sociology.
What ties Justice Cardozo's methods of decision to Holmes is Holmes'
emphasis on decision. Although Cardozo is careful not to reduce law
solely to prediction or prophecy, 37 the influence of Path is obvious
because Path deals critically with the forces that influence judicial
decisionmaking.38
This tradition in American legal thought is forcefully carried forward
by such post-realist schools as the legal process school associated with
Hart and Sacks39 and, to an even greater degree, by the jurisprudence
of McDougal and Lasswell.' According to the approach espoused by
McDougal and Lasswell, it is the observer who must focus attention on
the decisionmaker 4 The observer observes in law a special kind of
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

CARDOZO, supra note 30, at 10.
Id. at 30-3 1.
See id. at 33-34.
See Holmes, supra note 1, at 464-78.
See Erwin N. Griswold, Preface to HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE

LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW at vii-ix

(William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Phillip P. Frickey eds., 1994).
40. See 2 LASSWELL & MCDOUGAL, supra note 28, at 960-72.
41. See W. MICHAEL REISMAN & AARON M. SCHREIBER, JURISPRUDENCE: UNDERSTAND-
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decisionmaking task.42 Law is a process of authoritative and controlling
decision whereby members of the community, including judges, seek to
clarify and implement their common interests.43 The observer observing
decisionmaking is also interested in the anatomy of choice as well as the
dynamic of decisionmaking-how the anatomical parts actually function
to produce a decision or a special juridical choice." These functions
and factors of decision include functions like the intelligence aspect of
decisionmaking.45 Other key functions of decision include invocation,
46
promotion, prescription, application, appraisal, and termination.
Holmes' predictive theory makes its appearance in the hands of both
the operator (who is interested in theories of law from an internal point
of view) and in the hands of a theorist (who is a scientific observer and
who must maintain an external perspective of observation).4 7 McDougal
and Lasswell develop a set of tools to avoid the predictor predicting
herself a dilemma. They also build on the traditions of Cardozo and
others to develop a set of intellectual tools to explore judicial
decisionmaking in a pragmatic way. These tools include the delimitation
of context and problem, the clarification of goals and norms, the
description of trends and conditions, the appraisal and projection of
probable outcomes (prediction), and the creative estimate of policy
alternatives. 41 I suspect that Path's legacy suggests a richer framework
for legal pragmatism, richer than the law and economics approach of the
Chicago school and richer than the theories of legal realism that focused
on result selection and minimized process, but did not take responsibility
for value commitments.49
ING AND SHAPING LAW: CASES, READINGS, COMMENTARY 12-13 (1987).

42. See id. at 15-17.
43. 1 LASSWELL & MCDOUGAL, supra note 28, at 368; see also REISMAN & SCHREIBER,

supra note 41, at 18-19 (chart).
44. 1 LAsSWELL & MCDOUGAL, supra note 28, at 27, 150-66.
45. Id. at 29.
46. Id.
47. See generally Holmes, supra note 1. Path, as suggested, may be divided into two
primary parts. The first part is very much an internal "operator's" insight, and its emphasis is
on limits. This part ends with Holmes saying, "So much for the limits of the law. The next thing
which I wish to consider is what are the forces which determine its content and its growth."
Holmes, supra note 1, at 464. I suggest that this latter part of the essay is not law from the
operator's perspective. It is law from an external vantage point.
48. See 2 LASSWELL & McDOUGAL, supra note 28, at 725.
49. Professors Lasswell and McDougal, working from a multi-disciplinary perspective,
urge that we assume responsibility for our fundamental value commitments. 1 LASSwELL &
McDOUGAL, supra note 28, at 193-201. They believe it is socially responsible to make clear the
value commitments that one recommends as a scholar to the larger community. Id.
They also recommend the intellectual technique of postulation to give coherence to
description, to give analysis a relevant focus, and to provide a means of testing the values one

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol49/iss3/4

12

Nagan: Not Just a Descending Trail: Traversing Holmes' Many Paths of the
DUNWODY COMMENTARY

Having emphasized what I believe to be one of Holmes' most critical
insights into law, namely the emphasis on judicial decisionmaking, it
hardly needs to be stressed that the perspective of the judge, the
operative decisionmaker, is only one important perspective that
jurisprudence must account for. The anti-formalist approach to judgemade law opens inquiry to an even broader social phenomenon-the
nature of decisionmaking in general. Let us simply accept that the
judge's perspective is a highly relevant one for theory.
V. FOCUSSING THE LENS: THE PATH TO A
WORKABLE PERSPECTIVE

How are we to reconstruct the bad man? Holmes is very adamant that
the bad man's perspective is both obvious and obviously neglected."
The bad man's value to legal theory is not what Holmes ostensibly
invented him for: to promote a slick, graphic, novel way of separating
law from morality. David Luban has given a careful appraisal of the
etiology of the bad man in search of a deeper, more compelling
meaning.51 However, Luban's exercise does not improve upon the
classic positivist tenet that one needs a criterion to separate law from the
cultural and moral rules of social organization.
If this road does not take either Alschuler or Luban very far, is there
nonetheless a key jurisprudential insight in the bad man metaphor? If
read functionally, the bad man is the key to a law that is truly scientific.
The bad man is no judge. He is not the embodiment of any solution in
law. To the contrary, he epitomizes its problem. The insight is both
neglected and compelling: the better we understand the problem to
which law must respond, the better we are able to anticipate law's levels
of intervention and the consequences occasioned by the process of
intervention. From the vantage point of an observer, the bad man is a
unit of the legal and moral order who makes demands for goods,
services, or honors. In short, the bad man claims the weal and demands
insulation from the woe. Path does not effectively develop this powerful
insight.
If law should be responsive to claims for the allocation of the desired
and undesired things in social process, the relevance of the context of
social or community organization cannot be gainsaid. Here we see the
recommends for the community. Id. They postulate the principle of universal human dignity and
proceed to specify in diverse contexts its specific meaning and understanding for the allocation
of desired values in society. Id.
50. See Holmes, supra note 1, at 459.
51. See generally David Luban, The Bad Man and the Good Lawyer: A Centennial Essay

on Holmes's The Path of the Law, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1547 (1997).
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idea that perspective becomes a disturbing and critical legal construct.
For law to be responsive to claims, the perspectives of claimants must
be part of the empirical and conceptual universe we call law. But these
perspectives of demand, of identity, even of expectations are, at the end
of the day, subjective events from the perspective of the claimant. What
are they from the point of view of the scholar and the judge?
The focus of legal theory on the perspectives of the claimants carries
the important jurisprudential implication that law responds to and is
influenced by demands for the allocation of weal and woe. Regardless
of how law actually responds, the raw subjectivities of the ordinary,
non-specialist participants are at the back of all legal decisionmaking.
The claims of modem feminist, critical race, human rights, and critical
legal studies theorists are efforts to reconstruct legal theory by the
politics of participatory inclusion. This operates at many important
levels of legal and social organization, but also in the domain of
operative ideas, ideals, methods, and techniques of how we think, what
we do, and how we appraise what we call law.
Pathprovides the unspoken connection between Posner-style law and
economics on the one hand and the post-modem jurisprudence of social
and juridical inclusion on the other. The bad man's externality in
Holmes' terms is only related to the narrow issue of whether one
secures the objectivity of law from being contaminated with the
subjectivity of internal moral sentiment. The general fact of perspective
of identity, claim, and expectation looms large in a legal and social
universe of decisionmaking.
These points about perspective are important to the jurisprudence of
post-realism. In particular, the jurisprudence of the policy sciences has
given detailed attention to the problems of standpoint and perspective.
Indeed, I would suggest that the key flaw in Path yields one of its most
powerful insights: the multiplicity of perspectives that permeate
academic conversation about law and legal theory. Path yields two
radically different perspectives.52 First, there is the operator's view of
law: the bad man's point of view. Second, the bad man's view is
conflated into a judge's perspective. Both actors are players in the
operative arenas of law. Perhaps we can loosely label these actors
participants and distinguish their perspective from that of the detached
observer. Perhaps inelegantly, we can suggest that the operative
participants are looking at law from an internal point of view. In
contrast, the observer, the scientist, and the grand theorist are looking
at law from the external point of view.

52. See supra note 47.
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In suggesting these distinctions, I am fully aware that Holmes viewed
law as an external phenomenon. However, I am suggesting that a deeper
analysis of Path indicates two incompatible perspectives-a collapse of
the viewpoint of operators with those of appraisers of the system. The
problem in Path is that Holmes slips between these vantage points
unconsciously. But the very contradictions implicit in the piece-which
reads like a stream of consciousness-are the grist of vital insights into
the evolution of modem American legal thought. For example, Holmes'
skepticism of logic emanates essentially from an external, not an
internal, operator's perspective.
The bad man is a device, as we have seen, to separate law from
morality. This is a classic positivist distinction, but Holmes himself
sought to undermine the objectivity of logical syntactical analysis by
suggesting that he could give any conclusion a logical form. 3 So
Holmes rescues this positivist tenet from himself by the device of the
bad man.
We ought to be hesitant about a complete divorce of Holmes from
the vestiges of formalism. Perhaps Holmes' most influential contribution
to the practice of law has been his vested rights theory.' It was a
theory supported by such distinguished judges as Cardozo 5 and such
53. From the "external" perspective, Holmes deconstructs the centrality of "logic" in law:
And the logical method and form flatter that longing for certainty and for repose
which is in every human mind. But certainty generally is illusion, and repose is not
the destiny of man. Behind the logical form lies a judgment as to relative worth[,]
often an inarticulate and unconscious judgment ....
Holmes, supra note 1, at 466.
54. Nagan, supra note 19, at 421 n.170 (citing HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 314
(1920)). In Cuba Railroad v. Crosby, Holmes stated:
[W]hen an action is brought upon a cause arising outside the jurisdiction ....the
duty of the court is not to administer its notion of justice, but to enforce an
obligation that has been created by a different law. The law of the forum is
material only as setting a limit of policy beyond which such obligations will not
be enforced there. With very rare exceptions the liabilities of parties to each other
are fixed by the law of the territorial jurisdiction within which the wrong is done
and the parties are at the time of doing it. That, and that alone, is the foundation
of their rights.
Cuba R.R. v. Crosby, 222 U.S. 473, 478 (1912) (citations omitted); see also ALBERT A.
EHRENZWEIG, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 14 (1962). On the vested rights theory
generally, see Nagan, supra note 19, at 422-27, 423 n.178.
55. See Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 120 N.E. 198, 201 (1918) (Cardozo, J.) ("A foreign
statute is not in this state, but gives rise to an obligation, which if transitory, 'follows the person
and may be enforced wherever the person may be found.... ' The plaintiff owns something and
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powerful scholars as Professor Beal, author of the Restatement of
Conflict of Laws (1934). Holmes did predicate the notion of a rights6
based law of multi-state problems on a sense of social realism, but
the rights-based model was in effect a system of rights and their logical
interrelations.
The social realism aspect of his theory of vested rights would have
been simple enough: if the legal system had not created the notion of a
"right," a "dog would fight for his bone.""7 Still, the vested rights,
territorial sovereignty conception served as the cornerstone of one of the
most formal expressions of American law: the traditional" or First
Restatement's view of conflict of laws. 9 Rights and rules are, it seems,
the antidote to interstate anarchy.' Appraisers of Holmes as the
we will help him get it. We do this unless some sound reason of public policy makes it unwise
for us to lend our aid." (citations omitted)).
56. See supra note 54.
57. Nagan, supra note 19, at 421.
58. See, e.g., Crosby, 222 U.S. at 478; Slater v. Mexican Nat'l R.R., 194 U.S. 120, 126
(1904); HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 314 (1920). In Slater,for example, Holmes stated
the following:
The theory of the foreign suit is that, although the act complained of was subject
to no law having force in the forum, it gave rise to an obligation, an obligation,
which, like other obligations, follows the person, and may be enforced wherever
the person may be found. But as the only source of this obligation is the law of the
place of the act, it follows that that law determines not merely the existence of the
obligation, but equally determines its extent.
Slater, 194 U.S. at 126 (citations omitted).
59. See supra note 54.
60. The modem jurisprudence of positivism indicated a central tenet that in order to
objectify law, there had to be a criterion objectively specified or assumed by which any
communication could be tested for its legal pedigree. According to Austin, the test was whether
the purported rule originated in the sovereign. See Nagan, supra note 19, at 421 (citing John
Austin, The Province of JurisprudenceDetermined, in I J. AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE OR THE PHILOSOPHY OF POsrrIvE LAW 79-341 (R. Campbell 5th ed. 1911) (six lectures
originally delivered at the University of London in 1828, parts of which were limitedly published
in 1823)). Under Kelsen's "pure theory," the criterion of identification was a critical hypothesis
or basic norm known as "Grundnorm." See generally H. KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW
AND STATE (A. Wedberg trans., 1945). In the jurisprudence of modem analytical positivism,
Professor H.L.A. Hart developed the idea of a master secondary rule of recognition. H.L.A.
HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 79 (1962). The work of Professor Dworkin has demonstrated that
law and rights are not only derived from some master principle, but in effect, are subject to
complex processes using tools of justification rather than formal logical analysis from an initial
starting point. DWORKIN, supra note 34, at 22-130. In this sense, the techniques of justification
that often incorporate rigorous moral analysis enlarge the boundaries of legal discourse and legal
decisionmaking. Other approaches stress, not only normative analysis, but also rigorous
contextuality as central to the processes of legal decisionmaking. See I LASSWELL &
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predictor of social advantage or the skeptic of precept-oriented
jurisprudence would have to give a fuller accounting of Holmes in a
multi-state law context.
My submission to Holmes' effort to separate law from morality was
the view, probably common in his time, that law is external and
objective and that morality is internal and subjective. Modem theory and
practice has been less fixated on a classic indication of objectivity, the
criterion of validation, and has often used methods of justification as a
means to objectively interpret law.6' Theorists have been at pains to
make the discourse of moral order subject to argument based on
justification. Not just any subjective preference is the equivalent of a
moral precept. In this sense, law and morality in modem law edge ever
closer together. Holmes' point from an external, objective law perspective is not as powerful as it ostensibly once was. However, his more
general point about the objectivity of law is a serious matter, not often
directly assayed in the legal literature. The very point about objectivity
is that it is the antithesis of subjective arbitrariness. Objectivity is in
some measure sustained by a normative justification!
A clearer expression of this idea emerges from his theory of
interpretation. Because I suspect this debate is one that is joined by
positivism and post-modem theory, I shall seek to spell out the problem
more carefully. In Holmes' celebrated essay, The Theory of Legal
Interpretation,62 Holmes provided an extension of the notion of the
externality of law6' in the distinction between law and morals to the
issue of interpretation. Legal language, he suggested, ought to be
interpreted according to the idea of an ideal speaker of the language.'
Holmes' key insight is that interpretation is not to "discover the
particular intent of the individual, to get into his mind and to bend what
he said to what he wanted."' Rather, interpretation must determine
"what those words would mean in the mouth of a normal speaker of
English."'
I suggest somewhat heretically that on occasion, Holmes must have
felt that formalism was only objective and external in an illusory sense:

McDOuGAL, supra note 28.
61. DWORKIN, supra note 2, at 166-77.
62. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Theory of Legal Interpretation, 12 HARV. L. REV. 417

(1899).
63. In The Path of the Law, Holmes observed that: "The law is the witness and external
deposit of our moral life." Holmes, supra note 1, at 459.
64. See Holmes, supra note 62, at 417-18.
65. Id. at 417.
66. Id.
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"You can give any conclusion a logical form."'67 His reformulation of
positivism is an effort to rescue it from the vagaries of human subjectivity. What are the implications of this view? I suggest that the soft
underbelly of post-modem jurisprudence is the charge that far too much
subjectivity is made a part of the universe of law.
Posner's utilitarian calculus tries to cure some of this subjectivity,
and abstract economic equations certainly give a veneer of objectivity
to the entire law and economics enterprise. The attempt is not wholly
successful. Further, areas like critical race theory, feminist jurisprudence,
old-fashioned legal realism, and even the policy-oriented jurisprudence
of McDougal and Lasswell are vulnerable to this powerful and enduring
Holmesian point.
How can post-modem jurisprudence respond to such a critique? One
response may be distilled from the jurisprudence of McDougal and
Lasswell, which suggests two useful arguments that undermine the
external, objective character of law in Homesian terms. The first
response is a general insight into social theory and social process and
is reflected in the traditional dichotomy of social science, which posits
a radical distinction between the individual and the community, the self
versus society, the individual versus organized social process. Lasswell
suggested that this was a problem of both cognition and method, and
that confusions in this regard had generated a discourse about a fictitious
cleavage between the individual and the larger community.6" In fact,
according to Lasswell, what we observe, if we have the right orientation
and the correct tools of description and analysis, is a continuum of
reference points that reflect the subjectivities of the individual components of social process.69 So-called collective behavior is not objective
behavior, but an observable, discoverable expression of shared
subjectivities."
When we apply this insight to the business of interpretation in law,
we are not looking for an ideal user or, to use Holmes' term, speaker of
"English."'7 1 Rather, what the interpreter is looking for is the
subjectivities of the actual participants, including the specific individualized perspectives and the shared perspectives that are also shared
subjectivities. The search for meaning through individualized and shared
subjectivities does have an external aspect to it. However, under
Holmes' scheme, the interpreter must strive for it. In the post-modem

67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Holmes, supra note 1, at 466.
HAROLD D. LASSWELL, PSYCHOPATHOLOGY AND PoLITICS 341 (1930).

Id.
Id.
Holmes, supra note 62, at 417.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol49/iss3/4

18

Nagan: Not Just a Descending Trail: Traversing Holmes' Many Paths of the
DUNWODY COMMENTARY

sense, this is a fact to be overcome, because one cannot directly observe
all the subjectivities of the relevant universe of participants.
I have suggested the following:
[O]bserving the subjectivities of component actors is an
exercise in realism if decisions are to be made about "real"
demands (perspectives). Some of these components of
behavior are easily observable and we tend to call these
facts "objective." Some components of behavior are less
observable and we call these facts "subjective." Because we
cannot readily or easily observe and record less observable
behaviors in the process of social interaction, the objective
model of law implicit in Holmes' formulation would tend
to discard the less observable as an insufficiently "hard"
predicate upon which to sustain the concept of law. The
terms "objective" and "subjective" have presented a rigid
dichotomy that seems to have had a life of its own in
law .... 2
It may be added that the distinction seems to have inhibited the
development of a realistic approach to legal and social theory, as well
as methods of inquiry. A more rational approach
would place behavioral interaction on a continuum which
moves from the more to the less observable. To the extent
that there are techniques to discover the less observable
facts of human behavior, there would appear to be no good
reason to exclude such techniques and facts from shaping
the legal myth to comport more realistically with the human
subjectivities found in ever evolving community expectations about control, authority and the allocation of values.
The contents of consciousness are empirical. The critical
question should therefore focus on the indices one uses to
distill the content of consciousness in context. It is these
indices that "ought" to shape the decisional role.73
Thus, Holmes' external, objective model of law and its descendants
fall prey to the critique that the approach holds a
lack of a principle of realism; [a] lack of a principle of
contextuality; [an] inability to supply meaningful empirical
indices that "ought" to frame the decision role as a chal72. Nagan, supra note 19, at 480.

73. Id.
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lenge to the traditional and emergent demands of men and
women in society. The focus of inquiry implicit in Holmes'
demand for objectivity appears to require that the
decisionmaker purge himself of the crucial facts of social
interaction animating the claim in the first place-the
subjectivities of the claimants themselves.
By making law "objective," [Holmes and his followers]
sustain a very old tradition. [They seek] to refine the
concept of law without power; a concept which [holds] that
the legal regime [can] sustain and regenerate a continuing
[legal] myth independently of the power process.74
Modem conventional theory does this in a "refined and ...sophisticated manner." 5 In doing so, it perpetuates, for example, an egalitarian
myth in form and an operational inegalitarian code of practice, a formal
myth of justice and fairness under law, and an operational code of
police brutality. In the larger, global sense, this includes grotesque
violations of human rights and dignity. To respond to these kinds of
problems in law in a meaningful way, we cannot strive to purge
ourselves of social fact, of the perspectives of law's consumers,
including the marginal classes. To include them in the legal calculus
does not guarantee a more just social order, but it does present a better
chance of improving the condition of society and promoting social
advantage if the politics, law, and jurisprudence of inclusion are
ascendant.
VI. CONCLUSION

It seems to me that The Path of the Law takes us into the heart of the
modem controversies about the nature, purpose, and vision of both law
and the legal profession. There is no one path in this piece. There are
a number of intersecting trails, stirring visions of the consequences of
brute force if you get lost and of the possibilities of human advantage
if you find your way.
Finally, I have a sympathy for Professor Alschuler's interest in moral
values associated with natural law. Perhaps he might have followed
post-modem theory in some braver directions and considered the
important practical relevance of human rights for the processes of
making and applying modem law.

74. Id.
75. Id.
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